Russell Weigley surveys decidion and its limits in
The search for resolution was also manifested at war's operational levels. In part this reflected the growing homogenization of Europe's armies: their acculturation to common patterns of training, organization, and tactics. Armies kept abreast of each others' innovations, not least through a pattern of middle-ranking officers moving from service to service. In contrast to forces developed in different frameworks, symmetrical opponents seldom offer each other obvious windows of opportunity. To defeat a mirror image requires a combination of planning and opportunism that has defied capable generals before and since the Age of Reason. Frederick of Prussia was not the first to conclude that victory must be won at the beginning of a war, by getting inside an enemy's loop of competence and turning his strengths to weaknesses.
2 The alternative was attrition: the kind of drawn-out, exhausting war no early modern government could afford. Theodor Scheider, "Macht und Recht. Der Ursprung des Eroberung Schlesiens durch Koenig Friedrich II von Preussen," Hamburger Wirtschafts-Jahrbuch fuer Wirtschafts-und Gesellschaftspolitik, 24 (1979): 235-251 , is the best analysis of a decision remaining in many ways opaque. In the course of the Seven Years' War alone Prussia lost 13,000 houses destroyed, and 60,000 horses dead. In the province of Pomerania one-fifth of the population died of hardship and disease. Sixty thousand more died or disappeared in Neumark-Brandenburg, the heart of the kingdom. When all the losses were reckoned, even given the army's 180,000 dead, a Prussian soldier was arguably safer than a Prussian civilian.
